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We describe a quantum key distribution protocol based on pairs of entangled qubits that generates
a secure key between two partners in an environment of unknown and slowly varying reference
frame. A direction of particle delivery is required, but the phases between the computational basis
states need not be known or fixed. The protocol can simplify the operation of existing setups and
has immediate applications to emerging scenarios such as earth-to-satellite links and the use of
integrated photonic waveguides. We compute the asymptotic secret key rate for a two-qubit source,
which coincides with the rate of the six-state protocol for white noise. We give the generalization of
the protocol to higher-dimensional systems and detail a scheme for physical implementation in the
3 dimensional qutrit case.
Introduction. — Technologies based on the principles
of quantum information [1] promise a revolution in in-
formational tasks such as computer processing [2, 3] and
communication [4]. Secure communication via quantum
key distribution (QKD) is one quantum information ap-
plication that can be realized with current technologies
[5–8]. All the photonic QKD protocols proposed to date
have in common the need for a shared reference frame
between the authorized partners Alice and Bob: align-
ment of polarization states for polarization encoding, in-
terferometric stability for phase encoding. This require-
ment can in principle be dispensed with by encoding lo-
gical qubits in larger-dimensional many-photon physical
systems [9]. However, the creation, manipulation and de-
tection of many-photon entangled states, are both tech-
nically challenging and very sensitive to the losses on
the Alice-Bob channel — in a word, impractical. To
date, therefore, all practical implementations of QKD
within an environment of varying phase, have required
the frames of Alice and Bob to be actively aligned by
classical communication.
In this paper, we present a reference frame independ-
ent (rfi) protocol that can be implemented with ordin-
ary sources and operate without frame alignment, bey-
ond the obvious establishment of a particle delivery link.
Moreover, there are at least two emerging scenarios in
QKD that will benefit from an rfi implementation (Fig-
ure 1). The first such scenario is earth-to-satellite QKD
[10–18]. In this case, one axis of the reference frame
is well defined: the beam must obviously connect the
earth station with the satellite. On this beam, informa-
tion encoded in circular polarization is very stable, but
the linear polarizations may vary in time because the
satellite may be rotating with respect to the ground sta-
tion. The second scenario is path encoded chip-to-chip
QKD. The monolithic structures of planar waveguides
have been successfully used to perform the stable inter-
ferometric measurements required in time and phase en-
coded QKD [19–22]. More recently integrated quantum
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Figure 1: (Color online) Two meaningful scenarios for refer-
ence frame independent QKD. (1) Polarization encoding in
earth-to-satellite quantum communication. Here, the circular
polarisation states are stable, but the linear states can vary
with the rotation of the satellite. (2) Path encoding in chip-
to-chip quantum communication. While the path information
is stable, the unpredictable wavelength-scale changes in rel-
ative path length amount to a varying reference frame. This
may occur between chips communicating through free space,
or between chips connected by optical fibres.
photonic circuits have demonstrated their potential as
components for more general quantum information tasks
[23–28]. In these latter cases path encoding is typic-
ally used, enabling deterministic single photon manip-
ulations, in contrast to the probabilistic manipulations
used in time bin encoding. In a path encoded chip-to-
chip setup, the “which path” information is very stable,
2but it is unthinkable to expect interferometric stability
between two separate channels connecting the Alice and
Bob chips. In these and similar scenarios, our protocol
leads to the generation of a secure key without aligning
the frames, as long as the repetition rate of the signals is
faster than the rate of change of frame.
The protocol for two qubits. — For ease of notation,
we denote by {X,Y, Z} the three Pauli matrices usually
written {σx, σy, σz}. We assume that one direction is
well defined, which is the case for all the usual encodings
in QKD: the circular basis in polarization encoding, the
time basis in time-bin encoding, the which-path basis in
path encoding. So we set ZA = ZB. The other two
directions are related by XB = cosβXA + sinβYA and
YB = cosβYA − sinβXA, where β may vary in time.
We present the protocol in its entanglement-based ver-
sion where Alice and Bob share the state ρAB, which
in the ideal case is the |φ+〉 Bell state; an equivalent
prepare-and-measure version can be obtained through
the usual recipe (see e.g. II.B.2 in [7])
In each run, Alice and Bob choose independently one
of the three directions (randomly but not necessarily with
the same probability) and measure the quantum signal
they receive in the corresponding basis. At the end of
the signal exchange, they reveal their bases. The raw key
consists of the cases where both have measured in the Z
basis; so the quantum bit error rate is given by
Q =
1− 〈ZAZB〉
2
. (1)
In order to estimate Eve’s knowledge, Alice and Bob need
to use the information collected on the bases comple-
mentary to Z. The quantity
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2 (2)
+ 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2 (3)
is independent of the relative angle β and will be used to
bound Eve’s knowledge. The maximal value under Pauli
algebra is C = 2, achievable only by (a subset of) two-
qubit maximally entangled states — note that, in this
case, one has Q = 0 as well: the two parameters C and
Q are not independent, as we shall see in more detail
later.
Before turning to a formal security proof, it is import-
ant to understand how the protocol is affected by the fact
that β may vary in time. C being a statistical quantity,
its estimation requires several repetitions of the exper-
iment. A variation of β during the run will have the
effect of smearing the estimated correlations. For the
protocol to be useful, therefore, Alice and Bob should
collect sufficient signals to create a key above the finite-
size effects [29, 30], in a time short enough for β not to
vary too much. Now, while the expected variations of β
should be estimated in order to assess the feasibility of
an implementation, during the run of the protocol β is
not a parameter available to Alice and Bob: its monitor-
ing would amount to aligning the frames, which defeats
the purpose. In the context of security assessment, any
smearing of the correlations will be attributed to Eve’s
intervention.
Security bound. — As we have just seen, since β is
not monitored by Alice and Bob, we have to assume the
worst case scenario: β is fixed, known to Eve, and all the
smearing of the correlations is due to Eve’s intervention.
We derive an asymptotic security bound against coherent
attacks by an eavesdropper, under the assumption that
the source produces a two-qubit state.
As a first step, we notice that Alice and Bob process
each pair independently of the others. This fact, together
with the assumption that we are dealing with finite-
dimensional systems, guarantees that we can compute
the bound by restricting to collective attacks [31, 32].
Thus, each pair shared by Alice and Bob is supposed
to be in the two-qubit state ρAB, of which Eve holds a
purification.
The second step consists in proving that we can con-
sider ρAB (or just ρ for ease of notation) to be Bell-
diagonal in some Bell-basis known to Eve, without loss
of generality. The proof is similar to the one presented
in Refs [33, 34]. First, we use the fact that C is invari-
ant under the transformation XA → −XA, YA → −YA,
XB → −XB and YB → −YB. This transformation can
be implemented on ρ itself as the unitary ZAZB. In the
presence of such a symmetry, it is not restrictive to re-
place ρ by ρ˜ = 1
2
(
ρ + ZAZBρZAZB
)
: indeed, if Eve can
gain some knowledge out of ρ, she can gain the same
knowledge out of ZAZBρZAZB; by mixing them, she can
therefore gain at least the same knowledge, and maybe
more because the state is more mixed. As for Alice and
Bob, they do not notice any difference, since they are
looking only at Q and C. So presently we have
ρ˜AB = µ1PΦ+ + µ2PΦ− +
(a
2
|Φ−〉〈Φ+|+H.c.
)
+ µ3PΨ+ + µ4PΨ− +
( b
2
|Ψ−〉〈Ψ+|+H.c.
)
(4)
where Pψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and the four states represent
the usual Bell basis. For convenience of notation,
let us call this state ρ˜(a, b). Now, we have C =
2
[
(µ1 − µ2)2 + (µ3 − µ4)2 + Im(a)2 + Im(b)2
]
. There-
fore C will be the same for the state ρ˜(−a∗,−b∗). By
the same argument as above, we can then study rather
the mixture ρ′ = 1
2
[ρ˜(a, b) + ρ˜(−a∗,−b∗)] = ρ˜(iA, iB)
with A = Im(a) and B = Im(b). This last state is Bell-
diagonal:
ρ′AB =
4∑
k=1
λk |Φk〉〈Φk| (5)
where |Φ1,2〉 = 1√
2
(
eiχ|00〉 ± e−iχ|11〉) and |Φ3,4〉 =
1√
2
(
eiχ
′ |01〉 ± e−iχ′ |10〉). The parameters are related
3as follows. Let A′ =
√
(µ1 − µ2)2 +A2: then λ1,2 =
1
2
(µ1 + µ2 ±A′) and cos2 χ = 12 + (µ1 − µ2)/A′. The ex-
pressions of λ3,4 and χ
′ are similar with µ3,4 and B. In
particular, C has the same value as above and now reads
C = 2
[
(λ1 − λ2)2 + (λ3 − λ4)2
]
. (6)
The third step is now formally identical to the one
for the BB84 protocol (we refer to Appendix A of [7]
for details). The four non-negative numbers λj are con-
strained by three conditions: they must sum up to 1 and
yield the measured values of Q and C. This leaves one
parameter free, that will be chosen as to maximize Eve’s
information. The first two constraints are taken into ac-
count by choosing the parametrization λ1 = (1−Q)1+u2 ,
λ2 = (1 − Q)1−u2 , λ3 = Q 1+v2 , λ4 = Q 1−v2 , where
u, v ∈ [0, 1]; in which case, Eve’s information reads
IE(Q, u, v) = (1−Q)h
(
1 + u
2
)
+ Qh
(
1 + v
2
)
(7)
where h is binary entropy. The third constraint (6)
reads C = 2
[
(1 −Q)2u2 +Q2v2] and we have to com-
pute IE(Q,C) = maxC IE(Q, u, v).
First note that IE(0, C) = h[(1 +
√
C/2)/2]. For Q >
0, we have v(u) =
√
C/2− (1−Q)2u2/Q; the condition
v ∈ [0, 1] translates as u ∈ [umin, umax] where umin =
1
1−Q
√
max[C/2−Q2, 0] and umax = min[ 11−Q
√
C/2 , 1].
We have not found an analytical optimization for the
whole parameter range. However, Q is expected to be
small in a practical implementation; and for all Q .
15.9%, one can show that d
du
IE(Q, u, v(u)) is strictly pos-
itive between umin and umax, for all C; whence
IE(Q,C) = IE (Q, umax, v(umax)) . (8)
A rapid benchmark for qubit protocols is their
robustness to white noise. For Werner states,
C = 2(1 − 2Q)2: assuming this relation, we find
IE(Q,C) = Q + (1 − Q)h[(1 − 3Q/2)(1 − Q)]. This is
exactly the same expression obtained for the six-state
protocol [7, 35]. The corresponding secret key rate
r = 1 − h(Q) − IE is positive for Q . 12.62%, so well
within the validity of (8).
Extension to higher dimensions. — Several QKD
protocols using higher-dimensional quantum systems
(qudits) have been proposed, see e.g. [36]. In principle,
they yield both higher key rates and larger robustness
to noise. Qudit encoding in photonic states has been
demonstrated using angular momentum modes [37] or
time-bins [38]. However, the control of the various relat-
ive phases (i.e. the stabilization of the reference frame)
is very delicate: this is the reason why practical QKD
has largely ignored higher-dimensional protocols. Even
at the theoretical level, to our knowledge, nobody has
explicitly computed security bounds against coherent at-
tacks for these protocols, even if the general theoretical
framework is in principle the same as for qubits.
A generalization of the rfi protocol, by removing the
need for frame alignment, may provide the benefits of
higher-dimensional encoding without the technical prob-
lems. Here we present such a generalization for qutrits.
The derivation of rigorous security bounds for qudit pro-
tocols is a challenge in itself and is left for future work.
It is known that d+ 1 sets of mutually unbiased bases
(MUBs) exist for particles of dimension d, where d is
a power prime [39, 40]. The joint space of any pair of
qudits can be quantified by the (d + 1) ⊗ (d + 1) meas-
urements. The protocol requires Alice and Bob to share
an ensemble of qudit Bell states and randomly project
their own particles onto the MUBs. Their joint compu-
tational basis outcomes provide the d dimensional key
which is impervious to the effects of a changing phase
between the computational states. The joint outcomes
of the complementary bases from the remaining d2 + 2d
measurements are used to calculate a fixed-but-unknown
phase invariant quantity Cd, the higher dimensional ana-
logue of the qubit case C.
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Figure 2: (Color Online) Integrated photonic components for
measurement in the qutrit version of reference frame inde-
pendent QKD. (a) The state splitter chip takes an arbitrary
qutrit input state and splits it into a superposition of two
probabilistic copies. The reflectivity of directional couplers
(DC) can be set to select the relative probability of the copy.
Two directional couplers implement a Mach Zender interfer-
ometer (MZ) with internal phase such that a photon exits
from the path opposite to the one in which it entered. (b) A
qutrit Hadamard chip takes a particular equal superposition
basis and rotates to the computational basis in preparation
for measurement. (c) Three state splitter chips are used to
make a superposition of four probabilistic copies of the incom-
ing states. One probabilistic copy is immediately measured
in the computational basis while the other three are fed into
different Hadamard chips before measurement.
4For example, a natural operator representation of
MUBs are the so called Weyl operators which have been
studied in the context of entanglement [41–43]. In the
case of the d = 3 qutrit the Weyl matrices are often
denoted by the set of eight τi matrices, each of which
has a conjugate transpose twin in the set, with the same
eigenvectors but with two permuted eigenvalues. C3 is
calculated on the unique eigenvector half set (neglecting
the key forming computational basis operators). With
joint expectation values defined by eij = Tr(τi⊗ τj .ρAB)
we find
C3 =
4∑
i,=2
4∑
j,=2
eije
∗
ij +
4∑
i,=2
−4∑
j,=−2
eije
∗
ij ≤ 3 (9)
where τ1 is the computational basis operator and those
operators with negative indices are the conjugate trans-
pose twin. The maximal value is C3 = 3, achievable only
by (a subset of) two-qutrit maximally entangled states.
One possible physical implementation of the qutrit
version of rfiQKD uses integrated photonic waveguides.
The rigid monolithic structure provides phase stability
between spatial modes, so while chip-to-chip communica-
tion is phase-unstable, all unitaries implemented on-chip
are highly stable. With a network of variable beam split-
ters, or directional couplers (DCs), one can implement
any unitary operator [44]. A pair of maximally entangled
qutrits can be created on a single chip via post selection
and with the aid of ancilla photons [45, 46]; alternatively
one may use a spontaneous parametric down conversion
source and select three pairs of points on the down con-
version cone [47].
To measure the incoming qutrits, Alice and Bob each
require a device that randomly projects onto the four
mutually unbiased bases. This device may be assembled
from two types of components: a state splitter and a
qutrit Hadamard gate. The state splitter is a 3 input
mode by 6 output mode circuit that splits the incom-
ing signal with three directional couplers of equal re-
flectivity and permutes the order of modes with Mach
Zender interferometers, as shown in Fig 2a. The qutrit
Hadamard device, shown in Figure 2b, is composed of
three directional couplers. In terms of Pauli matrices,
DC2 = 1√
2
(σz + σx)12; DC3 =
1√
3
(σz +
√
2σx)01; DC4
= 1√
2
(σz +σy)12, where the modes acted upon are noted
by the subscripts. One can confirm that DC4.DC3.DC2
is a matrix in the Hadamard set; all other Hadamards in
the set are accessible by adding phases to two of the three
modes [48]. Three state splitters and three Hadamards
fit together to make the random projector device shown
in Fig 2c.
Conclusion. — We have described a protocol for
exchange of a secure quantum key in an unknown and
slowly varying reference frame and identified specific
cases in which the protocol is useful. More general
scenarios can also be envisaged, for example, rfiQKD
may be useful in an environment of intermittent rapid
fluctuation where the key is exchanged during the
periods of relative stability without the need to realign
the reference frame. We expect further situations in
which rfiQKD is helpful to emerge. We have provided
a security proof for the qubit version of the protocol
and described how the protocol can be developed into
higher dimensions, with specific details of physical
implementation in the qutrit case.
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